Abstract
. These rising costs impose a substantial burden on the U.S. economy. Higher spending on public programs like Medicare and Medicaid strains state and federal budgets. Higher insurance premiums pose a challenge for employers and burden workers with higher health costs and lower wage increases.
The burden of rising health care costs is particularly problematic for small businesses, who tend to have much
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smaller pools of workers to spread risk and increasingly choose not to offer any health insurance to employees. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation's annual survey, nearly 100 percent of fi rms with 200 or more workers offer health insurance to their employees. Yet only 60 percent of fi rms with fewer than 200 workers offered insurance in 2006, a decline from 69 percent in 2000 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006) . At the same time health care costs are rising, the number of uninsured also continues to grow. To a large extent, individuals are uninsured because the cost of health insurance exceeds the value people place on insurance coverage. As health care costs grow faster than incomes, an increasing number of individuals are unwilling to purchase health insurance. The latest estimates indicate that 45 million people are without insurance at any given time during the year.
A substantial portion of rising health care costs is due to the effects of the insurance system itself. Health insurance provides valuable protection against unforeseen illness. However, many insurance policies are structured in a way that dulls consumer sensitivity to price and, in some cases, a price signal is absent from the market place altogether. The direct expenditure for health care by an insured person may be only a small portion of his or her total health care costs. This is characteristic of low deductible or fi rst dollar health insurance, whereby an individual covers little of the direct cost of health care. Moreover, the prevalence of this type of insurance is rooted in the tax treatment of health care generally.
Today the single largest tax expenditure in the tax code is the employee exclusion for employer-provided health insurance that, together with the other health care tax subsidies, averages roughly $300-$400 billion per year.
1 Individuals pay neither income nor payroll taxes on health care that is fi nanced through employer-provided health insurance. Thus, the tax code reduces the cost of health care when it is "pre-paid" or purchased in advance through an employer sponsored insurance plan. This has contributed to the prevalence of low deductibles, low co-insurance rates, and pre-paid coverage and may lead to the over-consumption of health care.
2 President Bush announced in his State of the Union address and in the Administration's FY 2008 Budget a proposal to dramatically reform the tax treatment of health care with the twin goals of making basic insurance more broadly affordable and improving the economic incentives that underlie the provision of health care and health insurance. Addressing the tax biases that encourage people to purchase overly generous health insurance and receive more of their compensation in the form of tax-preferred health care, rather than wages, is an important fi rst step in dealing with the rapid rise in health care spending. This paper explores some of the analyses of the effects of this proposal and discusses other approaches for reforming the tax treatment of health care.
CURRENT TAX TREATMENT
The tax code generally allows people who purchase insurance through their employer to exclude the value of their health insurance from both income and payroll taxes. People who purchase insurance on their own typically receive no tax benefi t, with the exception of the self-employed who can deduct insurance premiums from income tax, but not the payroll tax. Other major health tax subsidies include fl exible spending accounts (FSAs), health savings accounts (HSAs), and the itemized deduction for medical expenses above 7.5 percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. These other subsidies also allow taxpayers to exclude some out-of-pocket expenses from tax. FSAs apply for both income and payroll tax purposes, while HSAs and the itemized medical-expense deduction generally only apply for income tax purposes.
3 As shown in Figure 2 , together these tax subsidies total over $300 billion per year, with the employee exclusion for employer-provided insurance comprising nearly 90 percent of the total tax subsidies for health care.
The current tax treatment distorts health care decisions in several important ways by changing the price of health care relative to other consumption and depending on how health care spending is fi nanced. 4 First, taxpayers only receive the tax subsidy if they purchase health insurance through their employer. The difference in the after-tax cost of purchasing insurance through an employer or directly in the non-group market can be substantial. For a taxpayer in the 15-percent income-tax bracket and subject to the 15.3-percent Social Security tax rate, the after-tax cost of purchasing a dollar of insurance The RAND Health Insurance Experiment found health spending to be sensitive to price and that more generous insurance policies generally result in higher total health spending (Newhouse, 1993) . through an employer plan is just 70 cents, while the person purchasing insurance on his own receives no tax benefi t and pays the full dollar. Only employees who work for businesses that offer insurance receive the tax subsidy. Moreover, linking health insurance to employment creates "job lock," whereby people with poor health status may be more reluctant to switch jobs because of concerns of fi nding adequate health insurance. Job lock is a signifi cant concern because nearly 40 percent of businesses do not offer any health insurance.
Second, there is a tax bias to channel health care spending through employerprovided insurance because this ensures that the health care spending is exempt from income and payroll taxes. The individual can purchase a dollar of "pre-paid" health care through an employer-provided health insurance policy for every dollar of wages received. Thus, the current tax system builds in a large tax subsidy for "pre-paid" health care in the form of employer-provided health insurance.
This tax distortion has encouraged overly broad, fi rst-dollar insurance coverage. Equivalently, this tax bias discourages individuals from purchasing high-deductible health plans. The consequence is an overreliance on first-dollar coverage, which dulls the incentives for consumers to shop carefully for cost-effective health care. Research has indicated that there is considerable responsiveness of health care spending to price (Newhouse, 1993) .
Also, the existing health care tax subsidy creates an incentive for individuals to receive compensation in the form of employer-provided health insurance rather than wages. Compensation received as health insurance is free of income and payroll taxes, while compensation received as wages is not. The more compensation that can be funneled through employer-provided insurance (or simply health care for those with FSAs), the larger is the tax benefi t. These features of the current tax treatment help fuel higher expenditures on health care. 
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR A STANDARD DEDUCTION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE
The President announced in his State of the Union address and included in his FY 2008 Budget a proposal to replace most existing health care tax subsidies with a standard deduction for health insurance (SDHI) set at $15,000 for family coverage and $7,500 for individual coverage. The SDHI would apply for both income and payroll taxes, and the SDHI amounts would be indexed by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The SDHI would be fully available to those purchasing qualifying insurance that meets certain minimum standards regardless of how much individuals spend on health care or health insurance.
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The SDHI would also be available regardless of whether a person purchases insurance through their employer or directly, thereby providing the same tax benefi ts currently available through employer-based insurance to those who purchase insurance on their own in the non-group market. 6 The flat, uniform nature of the SDHI is a crucial feature of the proposal that effectively breaks the link between the size of the tax subsidy and how much a person spends on health care or health insurance. Under the SDHI proposal, consumers of health care no longer receive a larger tax benefi t if they consume more health care. Also, the tax subsidy would be no larger or smaller if consumers choose to channel health care spending through an insurance policy or pay for health care out-of-pocket, provided they have a least the minimal insurance coverage needed to qualify for the SDHI. Individuals would have a substantial incentive to purchase at least basic coverage in order to claim the SDHI. The proposal, in effect, provides a substantial incentive to purchase basic insurance, but removes taxes from most other health care decisions.
Figures 3 and 4 compare the value of the current tax subsidies to the subsidy associated with the SDHI for a family of four at different income levels (in 2009). Figure 3 compares the $15,000 SDHI to an average policy costing $14,000 in 2009. The value of the SDHI to a taxpayer generally exceeds the value of the current tax subsidy for taxpayers with incomes over $42,000. For lower-income taxpayers, the SDHI proposal has important interactions with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) because repeal of the current employee exclusion reduces earnings for purposes of computing a taxpayer's EITC. In the phase-in range of the EITC, additional earnings increase the EITC. Thus, for very-low-income taxpayers, the SDHI proposal has the effect of increasing a taxpayer's EITC payment and lowering his or her overall taxes. This works in the opposite direction for taxpayers in the phaseout range of the EITC, where EITC payments fall as earnings rise. The SDHI proposal lowers the EITC rate from 21.06 percent to 15 percent in order to partially address this interaction between the EITC and the SDHI. Figure 4 compares the $15,000 SDHI to a policy costing $6,000 in 2009, which is what a basic insurance policy is expected to cost in 2009 in the non-group market. The SDHI provides a substantially larger subsidy than a $6,000 plan purchased though an employer. Of course, if the 5 Qualifying insurance could not have deductibles in excess of the out-of-pocket maximum for HSA-type high deductible health plans ($11,000 for family coverage in 2007) and would be required to have an annual and lifetime benefi t similar to what is currently in place for HSA-type plans or roughly $1 million.
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As mentioned above, leveling the playing fi eld between the group and non-group markets would reduce job lock because non-group insurance is generally not dependent on an individual's place of work.
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It is estimated that the current average tax-preferred premium of $11,000 (in 2007) will grow to roughly $14,000 by 2009 based on the projected growth in private health care premiums provided by CMS. $6,000 policy were purchased directly in the non-group market, the current tax subsidy would be close to zero. Thus, the SDHI proposal provides a substantial incentive for those currently without insurance to purchase at least basic coverage.
What Are the Expected Effects of the SDHI Proposal on the Number of Uninsured?
As suggested by Figures 3 and 4 , the SDHI proposal can provide a substantial incentive for the uninsured to purchase insurance. This incentive is generally larger for people who pay both income and payroll taxes, but lower-income earners still benefi t because the SDHI would at least apply for payroll taxes. By leveling the playing fi eld between the group and non-group markets, however, the SDHI may also have important effects on the incentive for individuals to purchase insurance through their employers and for employer to offer insurance. The net effect of the SDHI proposal on the number of uninsured refl ects these two possibly offsetting effects.
There are also non-tax reasons for fi rms to offer health insurance. Principally, health insurance is a valued employee benefi t used to attract and retain workers. Also, large and medium-sized fi rms have the advantage of lower administrative costs relative to small fi rms and the nongroup market. Table 1 summarizes recent estimates of these effects developed by the Treasury Department, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), the Congressional Budget Offi ce, and the Lewin Group.
The estimates in Table 1 indicate that, on net, the SDHI proposal is expected to increase the number of insured from six million to nine million. The estimates suggest the effects of the SDHI proposal on the employer market are highly speculative with the reduction in the number of people with employer coverage falling by anywhere from six million to 12 million, relative to the roughly 160 million people who currently obtain insurance through 1 Includes a 1.3 million increase in the number of people who purchase insurance through their employer. 2 Does not include the 1.1 million people estimated to switch to public coverage. their employer. The number of those who lose employer coverage and choose not to claim the SDHI and purchase insurance on their own is even more variable, with estimates ranging from 500,000 (JCT, 2007) to 2.3 million (Sheils and Haught, 2007) .
What Are the Distributional Effects of the SDHI Proposal?
A key feature of the SDHI proposal is that it redirects the current $300 billion a year tax subsidy for health care to help control health care costs through improved economic incentives and by channeling more of the tax benefi ts to those without insurance. Based on Treasury Department estimates from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, roughly 75 percent to 80 percent of health insurance policies are expected to cost less than the $15,000/$7,500 SDHI amounts in 2009. Middle-income taxpayers (the three middle quintiles) tend to benefi t more than the lowest-income earners because the benefi ts that accrue to the later group are primarily limited to payroll taxes. While broadly progressive, there is considerable heterogeneity underlying such an aggregate analysis. Generally, families with tax-preferred health care spending under $15,000 will pay less in taxes under the SDHI proposal. Those with tax-preferred health care spending over $15,000 are likely to have overly generous health plans, but could also live in higher cost regions, be older, and have poor health status or chronic conditions. 2nd $13,310; 3rd $28,507; 4th $50,448; 5th $87,758; top 10% $128,676; top 5% $177,816; top 1% $432,275. Source: Department of the Treasury, Offi ce of Tax Analysis.
LABOR SUPPLY EFFECTS
Beyond the effects of the SDHI proposal on the effi ciency of health care and the uninsured, the proposal may also have broader economic effects on the taxpayers' work effort by altering taxpayers' marginal tax rates. The SDHI proposal would affect taxpayers' marginal tax rates by changing the amount of their compensation that is taxable as it replaces most existing health tax subsidies with the new SDHI. The repeal of existing health tax subsidies increases taxable compensation, while the SDHI lowers taxable compensation. The effect of the proposal on taxable compensation generally depends on whether the SDHI amounts exceed a taxpayer's current tax-preferred health care spending. If taxable compensation increases, taxpayers will generally be pushed into higher income tax brackets or have more of their compensation exceeding the Social Security wage cap.
Estimates from Treasury's Health Care Tax Model indicate that the average marginal tax rate on labor income rises by roughly 2.3 percentage points in 2009 (from 31.4 percent to 33.7 percent), with about 1.2 percentage points attributable to income taxes and the remaining 1.1 percent attributable to payroll taxes. Note that there is considerable heterogeneity in these effects. For example, taxpayers who currently purchase insurance in the nongroup market face a reduction in their average marginal income tax rate of roughly 0.4 percentage points in 2009 (18.6 percent to 18.2 percent) because their taxable compensation is lowered by the SDHI, but they are unaffected by the repeal of existing health care tax provisions. Applying a 0.15 labor supply elasticity for primary workers and an elasticity of 0.7 for secondary workers suggests that the proposal would lose an additional $7 billion to $8 billion in revenue in 2009 because of the reduction in labor supply (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a recent review of the labor supply literature). Note that because the SDHI is designed to grow more slowly than tax-preferred health care spending, the labor-supply effects rise over time. As indicated by CBO (2007) , these labor-supply effects can also affect the level of output.
DEDUCTION OR A CREDIT?
Another approach for refocusing the existing tax subsidy for health care would be to provide a fl at credit rather than a standard deduction for health insurance. This alternative approach can improve economic incentives in much the same way as the SDHI proposal by:
• Removing the tax bias towards fi rst-dollar coverage; • Leveling the playing fi eld between insurance purchased in the group and non-group markets; and • Placing compensation received in the form of health insurance on equal footing with wages.
However, only a credit structure that is independent of how much a person spends on health insurance or health care would improve economic incentives in this manner. Importantly, both a fl at credit and the SDHI break the link between spending more on health care and the value of the tax subsidy. A credit, however, would have very different distributional effects, and, consequently, has very different effects on the number of uninsured. As Figure 6 illustrates, the uninsured are more likely to be lower income. Because a fl at credit provides the same tax subsidy, regardless of income, more of the tax benefi ts are likely to be focused on lower-income earners, who are also more likely to be uninsured. Put another way, a credit channels more of the tax subsidy to those most likely to be left out of the current system. The Treasury Department estimates that a $4,600 credit for families ($2,300 credit for individuals) would be roughly revenue neutral over the budget window (2009 through 2017) . Figure 7 overlays the $4,600 credit onto Figure 3 to compare the tax subsidies under current law, the SDHI proposal, and a credit proposal. Obviously, the credit provides a fl at subsidy equal to the credit amount. As is clear from Figure 7 , more of the tax subsidy is channeled to low-income earners under a credit than under the SDHI proposal or current law. However, since the proposal is revenue neutral, the larger benefi ts that accrue to lower-income earners imply that more people elsewhere in the distribution are likely to pay more in tax than under the SDHI proposal.
The progressive nature of credit proposal, as compared to the SDHI, is confi rmed in Figure 8 with the lowest-income earners receiving the largest reductions in tax as a percent of their income. These different distributional effects of the credit have a pronounced effect on estimates of the number of people with insurance with the Treasury Department estimating, on net, the number of newly insured would rise by 13 million to 15 million (Table 2) .
Several Congressional proposals have been introduced that would scale back or eliminated the existing employee exclusion and provide a refundable credit. A proposal introduced by Senator Martinez and Congressman Ryan (S. 397, H.R. 914) would cap the exclusion for employer-based insurance at $11,500 for family coverage ($5,000 for individual coverage). A refundable (and advanceable) credit would be provided for individually purchased coverage of up to $4,000 for joint fi lers with incomes below $30,000 and $2,000 for individuals with incomes below $15,000. The credit would phase down to $2,500 for families with incomes over $60,000 and to $1,250 for individuals with incomes over $30,000. The Martinez-Ryan proposal differs from the fl at credit in at least three important respects: (1) it would only be available for individually purchased insurance, (2) it would be phased-down by income, and (3) the credit would be allowed only up to the cost of health insurance. These three limitations result in a considerably smaller increase in the number of individuals purchasing insurance (net of changes in the group market) of one million to three million. Senator Coburn has introduced a comprehensive health care proposal (S.1019) that includes provisions to repeal the current exclusion for employer-based health insurance and allow a refundable credit up to $5,000 for families and $2,000 for individuals. The credit would only be available up to the cost of health insurance, but contributions to HSAs could also qualify for the credit. Thus, individuals purchasing insurance for less than the credit amounts could claim the entire credit provided the excess over the cost of the qualifying health insurance were contributed into an HSA. This feature limits the credit to health care spending, and, as reported in Table 2 , lowers the number of additional people with insurance (net of the effects on the group market) somewhat relative to a fl at credit: 11 million to 13 million under the Coburn proposal, rather than the 13 million to 15 million under the fl at credit.
The four proposals listed in Table 2 have substantially different effects on economic incentives, distributional effects and the number of additional people with insurance. The Martinez-Ryan proposal more closely resembles the current tax system than the other three approaches. The cap improves economic incentives, but it does not go as far as complete repeal of the current exclusion for employerbased insurance. Unlike the Administration's SDHI proposal and the fl at credit, both the Coburn and Martinez-Ryan proposals limit the tax subsidy to health care. The Administration's SDHI proposal and the fl at credit breaks the link between how much a person spends on health insurance or health care and the value of the tax subsidy (provided the person purchases at least minimum insurance). The fl at credit, however, involves substantially more redistribution of the existing $300 billion to $400 billion tax subsidy, involves a very different set of individuals who win and lose under the reform, and represents a considerably larger departure from the current tax treatment $4,600 ($2,300) credit for family (individual) coverage; repeals current exclusion for employer-based insurance.
Up to $4,000 ($2,000) credit for families (individuals) for lower income, phased-down for higher income; caps current exclusion for employer-based insurance at $11,500.
Up to $5,000 ($2,000) credit for families (individuals); repeals current exclusion for employer-based insurance. of health care than the Administration's SDHI proposal.
CONCLUSION
The President's proposal to reorient the largest tax preference in the tax code today-the $300 billion to $400 billion per year tax subsidy for health care-would break the link between the value of the tax subsidy and how much an individual spends on insurance or health care. The policy improves economic incentives by providing a large incentive to buy insurance and removing tax distortions that have encouraged people to purchase overly generous insurance and have likely contributed to the high spending on health care. The policy is progressive and estimated to increase the number of insured by anywhere from six million to nine million people. A fl at credit could improve economic incentives in very much the same way as the SDHI proposal, but would refocus much more of the existing health care tax subsidy to lower-income taxpayers. The more-pronounced redistributive effects of a fl at credit translate into larger estimated increases in the number of newly insured, but also involve greater heterogeneity in who wins and who loses than under the SDHI proposal and represent a larger departure from the current tax treatment of health care.
